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Abstract
The human psyche (soul) is jointly created by the actual 
world and the “mirror image of the world” (Wittgenstein). 
Culture creates a mirror of the world by constituting layers 
of discursive connection in which we are all immersed 
and which engender lived human experience. Lacan uses 
“the mirror phase” to unravel the development of human 
identity and self-conception and locate in it many roots 
for the psychological characteristics seen in adult life. 
When the mirror crack’d from side to side for the lady 
of Shallot, her world began to unravel. A post-colonial 
setting fractures the indigenous mirror of life such that the 
broken image at the heart of the alienation that results has 
damaging effects on the moral being of those belonging 
to a colonised culture as they try to articulate their lived 
experience. The fracture disconnects meanings, myths of 
origin and destiny, cultural icons and the discourses in 
which connections to place are affirmed by treating them 
as unreal and irrelevant to modern life. Colonisation is 
therefore potentially destructive to identity, self-worth, 
and the moral being of a colonised people because 
connections between self-worth and the roots of being 
have been disrupted in ways that are difficult to articulate. 
That results in deep wounds alienating self from world 
and undermining the informed dialogue that creates social 
and personal responsibility.
Key words: Post-colonialism; Alienation; Moral 
responsibility; Identity
Gillett, G. (2015). When the Mirror Cracks: Well-Being, Moral Responsibility, 
and the Post-Colonial Soul. Studies in Sociology of Science, 6(2), 1-7. Available 
from: URL: http://www.cscanada.net/index.php/sss/article/view/6457 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3968/6457
INTRODUCTION
“The soul,” announces Foucault, “is the present correlative 
of a technology of power over the body” (FR, p.176). 
In this he picks up a strand in Aristotle and Heidegger 
whereby the psyche (or soul) is seen as moulded, 
informed, inscribed, and given content through its many 
dealings with objects (Heidegger, 1953, p.12, 12; DA; 
431b21). Foucault expands this basic insight by noting 
that the soul, seen in this way, relates to objects both 
actually and through perception and thought and these 
modes of engagement combine to adapt an individual to 
the discursive contexts in which, as an epistemological 
and moral subject, that individual has to function. The 
techniques of adaptation therefore arise from discourse 
and the discursive positions that have shaped one’s 
subjectivity as a living soul (we see this beautifully 
explored in Du Bois’ The souls of black folk.) 
In “The Lady of Shallot” we read of a creature of faery 
cursed so that if she should ever look on the real world 
and down to Camelot she will die. She sees the world 
in her mirror and she is happy; she sings her songs, she 
provokes wonder in those who glimpse her alien existence 
in her enchanted tower, and she weaves her tapestry of all 
she sees in her mirror. Then she spies Lancelot riding by 
and is drawn to look full at him. 
Out flew the web and floated wide;
The mirror crack’ d from side to side;
“The curse is come upon me,” cried
The Lady of Shalott.1
Janet Frame describes herself as an adult as the envoy 
from mirror city (Frame, 1989). As she unfolds her 
story of a disadvantaged child in a small New Zealand 
town, we see her emerge into the world of literature and 
culture. She becomes the envoy whose place in the real 
human life-world is to bring to her fellow human beings 
a reflection of themselves discernible in the mirror world 
1 Alfred Lord Tennyson, “The lady of Shallot”, 1842.
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the world of discourse, literature, and the articulation of 
culture. 
Discourse changes us every day as we are mirrored 
and moulded by it. Literature, as part of that mirror 
world, tells us our stories and, through its artistry, reflects 
a subset of our cherished creative skills. Contemporary 
literary experience is becoming more and more multi-
stranded and reflects voices not our own but, though 
unfamiliar, imbued with a similar level of artistic beauty. 
The complex experience of speaking oneself into being 
using the resources of discourse is a site of both revelation 
and restoration for those who have been colonised and 
whose culture has been displaced from its situation - the 
place in which its roots are buried. Life forms are adapted 
to their place of origin and the forms of life that allow 
human beings to occupy and understand their niches 
also provide the roots through which human souls are 
nourished and grow (Weil, 1952). 
Picking up Aristotle’s thought, we conceptualise the 
soul as a form, something that is ideational and essential to 
the human life lived by each human being in his or her own 
way (Gillett, 2008). Thus the soul and its roots are cultural 
as much as geographical (indeed the two are organically 
connected, as many indigenous people remind us). If a 
culture is the source of the mirror in which each human 
being can see and reflect upon their lives and their values, 
then colonisation cracks the mirror in such a way that 
causes the image to be distorted and lives begin to unravel. 
We act on the basis of our thoughts about ourselves and our 
situations and those thoughts take shape in the mirror world 
and what it shows us about contexts in which social and 
personal life take on meaning (Williams, 1985, p.201). A 
crack’d mirror and the disrupted images it presents fracture 
all of a person’s thought including the moral framework of 
a people and that causes their tapestry of life to unravel. It 
is within the stories woven into the tapestry of our shared 
life that we create inter-personal connections and the 
responsiveness and that is the basis of moral responsibility. 
Tracing those stories and their disruptions is therefore an 
urgent challenge facing those concerned for the restoration 
of a caring society of responsible individuals in a post-
colonial context. As we think responsibly about the ethics 
of responsibility we must therefore consider the problems 
of self, identity, and moral responsibility that follow when a 
mirror is crack’d from side to side.
1.  THE MIRROR WORLD AND MEANING
Wittgenstein uses a telling metaphor to characterize our 
thinking about our being-in-the-world, one that is prior to 
any theory of society or culture.
Logic is not a body of doctrine, but a mirror image of 
the world. (Wittgenstein, 1922, TLP, 6.13)
He goes on to describe the structure of connected 
meanings that we use to describe or conceptualize our 
world in the following terms: All-embracing logic … an 
infinitely fine network—the great mirror. (TLP, 5511). 
But in a post-structuralist context we can no longer think 
of a unitary “infinitely fine network”, rather we should be 
limning a multiply layered mesh of interconnected stories 
that articulate the events that happen in the world so as 
“to differentiate the networks and levels to which they 
belong and to reconstitute the lines along which they are 
connected and engender one another” (Foucault, 1984, 
FR, p.56). 
Logic for Wittgenstein draws on a structured “web 
of belief” (Quine & Ullian, 1978) but the pattern of 
multiplex and interwoven connections we forge in 
discourse to trace paths of thought and meaning affect not 
only belief but worth and moral being. These connections, 
and the patterns of thought they produce, articulate our 
engagements with one another (as dasein-mitsein)2. In 
this sense “logic” and the structure of knowledge it brings 
with it is all-embracing and is our means of displaying the 
world as thinkable. The ways we think of ourselves and 
the world dictate the ways in which we act even though 
that process itself is problematic to understand and reflect 
upon: “What expresses itself in language, we cannot 
express by means of language” (TLP, 4121).
As we try to make visible what expresses itself in 
language, we are forced beyond the simplistic view that 
language is an “objective” and even-handed depiction that 
leaves all questions of value and power yet to be decided. 
That is because a change in “logic” or the structure of 
truth in ascendance at a given point in human history,
… is not a change of content (refutation of old errors, recovery 
of old truths), nor is it a change of theoretical form (renewal 
of paradigm, modification of systematic ensembles). It is a 
question of what governs statements, and the way in which they 
govern each other so as to constitute a set of propositions which 
are scientifically acceptable, and hence being capable of being 
verified or falsified by scientific procedures. In short, there is a 
problem for the regime, the politics of the scientific statement. 
(FR 54)
In any critical examination of our knowledge of 
ourselves as beings-in-the-world, we need also to bear 
in mind the fact that the systematicity (or regimen) of 
knowledge is a product of praxis and its components 
which “stem from three broad areas: relations of control 
over things, relations of action upon others, relations 
with oneself.” (FR, 48) These systems of praxis, 
underpinning discourse, introduce a technology of the 
self, a science and art of self-formation and care of 
the self in which humankind questions itself and each 
of us “speaks” and writes the self into being as zoon 
logon echeion (HB&T, 25; Hacking, 1995). Each of us 
as a human being and all of us as humankind, therefore 
produce ourselves in an image. That image of self is then 
the basis for self-attribution and the constructions that 
2 “Being there with others” as in Heidegger’s Being and Time.
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give significance to our actions as socio-political or moral 
beings.
The insight that human soul articulates itself according 
to an image leads Jacques Lacan to posit the imago 
or image-ego as a fundamental structure of human 
existence. It comes into existence through our reflection 
on the “mirror” created by the discourses in which we 
are immersed. Hacking writes, in a similar vein, of “the 
writing and re-writing of the soul” and “The looping 
effect of human kinds” thereby articulating the circular 
and reflective ways in which we conceive of ourselves 
and then enact and make real that nature which is self-
attributed according to an image we construct of our 
modes of being in the world. The imago as, in part, a 
product of the mirror world identifies each of us as a 
subjective locus of action responding to situations, what 
happens to us in them, and the subjectivity that results. 
As agents we act and respond to the effects of our actions 
on the basis of the imago. Subjective self-positioning and 
self-articulation therefore plays a key role in deciding how 
or even whether to perform an action. We are variably 
responsive to their likely effects on ourselves and others 
when we make those decisions and therefore  responsible 
to varying extents for what we do in ways that reflect our 
state of mind at the time. For instance, consider an agent 
whose state of mind is as follows:
You think I am no’count and don’t know nuthin and what I 
do don’t amount to nuthin and I can be left on the scrapheap. 
You think I don’t ought to do anything about the way my mum 
gets beaten up and my dad is angry all the time becos’ people 
disrespect him. You think I’m just a nuthin’ kid, and I got to 
know my place and do better for myself and then youse all laugh 
cos’ you think I can’t do nuthin anyhow but I am gonna show 
you guys, am I ever! And then you won’ be able to say I’m a 
nuthin and my folks are too. I tell you, you gonna see, good and 
sure that I am somethin’ you got to respect.
These self articulations are slightly at odds with the 
requirements of the image that fits the system of moral 
and socio-legal accountability (or giving an account of 
oneself) that is found in “upper decile society”. But what 
kind of responsivity is this - how has it been produced so 
that it responds to the world in this way? And how should 
responsibility be parcelled out when we see it in that 
light?
As we acknowledge the structural interconnections that 
criss-cross the images seen in the mirror world, we notice 
that they differ between differently situated individuals 
and the often radically different discourses they inhabit 
(Harre & Gillett, 1994).  We then begin to see the com-
plexity of social, personal and moral responsibility. These 
different levels of interconnectedness and engenderment 
and the explanations they subtend articulate our actual 
dealings with the lived world and its moral structure in 
which we move and have our being . The mirror world 
and its reflection of actuality has an uncertain and prob-
lematic relation to who we are and what we do because 
signifiers and their significance (particularly for terms like 
responsibility) have a potentially “sliding” relation to our 
embodied, subjective, being-in-the-world where, as real 
individuals we form part of each others’ lives. This uncer-
tainty or sliding of signifiers undermines the uniformity 
of meaning and the possibility of a universal rationality or 
morality (at a certain level) in such a way that we must ex-
plore Lacan’s point de capiton or “quilting point” (Lacan, 
1993).
2.  QUILTING AND THE SUBJECT
Lacan’s term “point de capiton” recognises the disparity 
between psychotic speech and “sane” speech and notes 
that they can fail to connect despite the fact that psychotic 
patients earnestly use language they share with their 
interlocutor. He links this fact to two thoughts regarding 
language (and therefore the world of meaning) and the 
role of difference in that analysis: 
(i)  differance marks a deferral of meaning such that 
the meaning of any term in part defers to the 
meanings of the other terms surrounding it in 
logical or semantic space; and 
(ii)  differance draws our attention to the fact that an 
item in the world of meaning (the mirror world) 
marks a difference in the actual things and 
conditions in relation to which it is used without 
itself constituting that difference. 
These two observations taken together mean that the 
way an event in the world impinges on me and is signified 
by me may not be commensurate with the way it impinges 
on another person who is with me in “the same situation”. 
Therefore, until we achieve a coming together of our two 
systems of meaning as they frame the mutual events, we 
will not understand one another. We can see this at work 
in an interview with a psychotic person whose speech and 
thought are bizarre and incomprehensible such that one 
cannot follow the (often disordered) stream of thought 
until a moment of discourse connects us in our relationship 
to the situation. It is differently engendered, in a post-
colonial setting, when problems may arise, for instance. 
because traditional understandings of customary and sacred 
places and the boundaries proper become obliterated in 
contemporary socio-legal patterns of land use. 
Wittgenstein lays out some helpful thoughts in this 
regard when he explicitly connects words to a fragment of 
a language (just as the pieces in a game of chess take on 
their significance in the context of the game) (Wittgenstein, 
1953). Understanding the word, phrase, or sentence 
depends on one appreciating what is being attended to as 
the thing being spoken about and the way that the words 
are framing that thing according to a subset of language or 
a discursive context (hence his affinity to structuralism or 
limited linguistic holism). But the structuralist move, and 
the thought that all signifiers slide over their signifieds, 
such that they only fix the meaning of the terms in an 
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utterance holistically, severs the one-to-one links between 
words and what they stand for. Thus when you and I 
speak of “that mountain” our thoughts may significantly 
miss one another (e.g. I think of a useful source from 
which granite for building could be quarried and you 
think of the grandfather who nourishes us, shelters us, 
and gives us a place to stand). That rift poses a seemingly 
intractable problem of incommensurability between 
differently nested knowledge claims (because the meaning 
of the knowledge claim is yielded only by accepting 
the holistic system—or structure—that determines the 
meanings of the terms comprising it). The most discussed 
corollary of that claim is in philosophy of science where 
it is posited that two different scientific theories cannot 
ever talk about the same things to the point that even two 
(so-called) “observation statements” depend for their 
significance on the system of observations and theory in 
which they are nested (this was made famous by Quine as 
the indeterminacy of reference or ontological relativity) 
(Quine, 1968). But in post-colonial settings a problem 
arises as we notice the predicament of human beings who 
find themselves in discordant systems of understanding 
identity and moral responsibility.
The second sense of differance—the gap between 
signification and our lived existence-makes vivid the 
whole “mirror-world” picture of meaning whereby 
our words are not just names for the actual things 
and conditions they signify or depend on for their 
meaning. Meaning, the mirror world, and the structural 
interconnectedness of any item that emerges from the 
two senses of difference, can only be “completed” by 
something that secures their application to the actual 
lived in world and thereby connects the discourses of two 
different speakers. That potential connection underpins the 
quilting points at which the signifier and signified can be 
linked to moments of engagement in the actual world in 
a way that also gives us access to each others’ discourses. 
That mutuality or connection enables both participants in 
a conversation to become grounded or rooted in a shared 
experience which gives them (and their words) life.
Every sign by itself seems dead. What gives it life? – in use it 
is alive. Is life breathed into it there? – Or is the use its life? 
(Wittgenstein, 1953, PI, 432)
Points de capiton link the mirror world and the lived 
world and provide us with a means of negotiating our way 
around in a shared human world in which we articulate 
our being as creatures who are attuned to it in diverse 
ways. In that sense the mirror world in-forms our ways of 
belonging and our powers of understanding and acting. 
Those conceptions and the points at which they connect 
us to what we do and say constitute the lived space as one 
in which the self understanding required for moral respon-
sibility can develop. But these discursive links are vulner-
able in various ways that emerge from Lacan’s analysis of 
the shaping of human psychology, or what Nietzsche calls 
“the development-theory of the will to power” (Nietzsche, 
1886/1975, p.35). 
3.  LACAN’S MIRROR PHASE
Lacan notes that the human infant is “born untimely” and, 
for that reason, is and, at a primal level, feels insufficient 
to the challenges of life (E, 4). Something therefore has to 
happen to correct the “organic insufficiency in his natural 
reality”. What happens is a process of self-formation that 
includes what Lacan refers to as “the mirror stage” (Lacan, 
1977). The mirror stage, in fact, is not so much a stage of 
psychological development but the basis of an ongoing 
mode of becoming-in-the-world-with-others whereby 
connections are forged between the Innenwelt and the 
Umwelt - the inner world of the psyche and the outer, sur-
rounding world in which one acts and becomes effective 
as an identifiable individual. The mirror stage is therefore 
“a drama whose internal thrust is precipitated from insuf-
ficiency to anticipation” whereby one transforms oneself 
from “a fragmented body-image to a form of its totality” 
and ultimately assumes an identity. But this is not just a 
simple identity of an organic or given nature, rather it is “an 
alienating identity” the site of “the ego’s verifications.” (E, 
4) In these “verifications” of who one is by the reflection 
of oneself in the faces and discourse of the other, the ego/
imago becomes potentially subject to meconnaissance 
organized by “the ‘reality principle’ – a principle that is 
the expression of a scientific prejudice most hostile to the 
dialectic of knowledge” (E, 6). This is not the reality prin-
ciple of Freud’s ego but an objectivization of the self that 
can override and even negate the lived experience of the 
self so that one’s knowledge of oneself can be distorted by 
the forms in which it is articulated. Lacan here echoes and 
analyses the possibility of bad faith fore-grounded by Jean 
Paul Sartre and derived from Heidegger’s analysis of the 
human being as the zoon logon echon,3 the being who uses 
the word to question lived existence and come to formu-
lations of it that may not be attuned to lived reality but are 
formative for self understanding. The medium in which 
these understandings can be formulated is discursive and 
falls under “a regime” that determines the governance of 
statements—the episteme of the dominant group in a hu-
man situation and its power/knowledge (FR)4.
Lacan’s short essay on the mirror stage argues for 
several theses about human beings.
(i)  Any human being in his or her lived being is 
completed by the context s/he inhabits in the 
human life-world. This process is, paradoxically, 
never finished but always dynamic such that the 
situated self is always re-configuring itself in 
the light of the context in which s/he functions 
and finds her “verifications”. For most of us the 
3 The living being whose essence is the word Zoon logon echo.
4 Foucault’s power/knowledge is summarised in FR.
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context is perfused by familiar cultural meanings 
which enunciate our links to our own origins and 
the sources of signification, celebration, memory, 
and order that hold things firm for us and give 
us a place to stand. These things also articulate, 
energise and in-form the network of meaning that 
is a mirror in which one can trace out or intuit 
one’s own reflection and thus they form the basis 
of action and responsibility.
(ii)  The real world abounds in a variety of discourses 
and relationships in which any individual is mul-
tiply enmeshed and that implies that a human be-
ing is not simply reflected in a unitary mirror but 
that the image one has of oneself may be multi-
plex and require some integration in order to be a 
suitable basis for conscious or coordinated action 
(Hughlings-Jackson, 1887)5. Thus the possibility 
of meconnaissance is inherent in the multiplicity 
of meanings and layers of signification that are 
vital to becoming somebody, somewhere, and 
it may be intensified if those meanings are only 
discernible in a mirror that has crack’d. 
(iii)  The real world is a domain of thought and action 
or the enaction of an identity. Therefore the 
imago empowers an individual, on the basis of 
his or her belonging and articulation of self, to 
craft a subjective life among others. The extent 
to which one’s primary insufficiency has been 
genuinely transformed into efficacy and a sense 
of ease with oneself (as a being-among-others 
or dasein-mitsein) is the extent to which one 
can be somebody with a place in the world and 
a sense of relationally supported self-adequacy. 
That is not a fiction but a point of grounding or 
resistance that stabilizes one’s being as a being 
who is worth something and supports stable 
patterns of action.
(iv)  The possibility of alienation means that the 
elaboration of the imago can become bound by 
what seem to be illusions, such as the illusion 
of autonomy, whereby one forgets that one’s 
being is rooted in belonging and only on that 
basis can one nourish and strengthen oneself in 
anticipation of the challenges that one will have 
to face. These illusions represent a falling apart 
of the world and its image so that one is lost in 
the aporia created by that schism. If the lived 
self cannot reconcile thought and reality so as to 
be attuned (or adapted) to the context of one’s 
life, one becomes defensive, insecure, resentful 
and hostile, constantly anticipating betrayal and 
5 This is prefigured by Hughlings-Jackson in his theory of the 
evolution and dissolution of nervous function; Hughlings Jackson, 
J. Remarks on the evolution and dissolution of the nervous system. 
Brit. J Psychiatry, 1887, 33, 25-48.
unable to achieve a good-enough mode of being-
in-the-world-with-others.
The child, born prematurely, draws on its image to see 
who it is, and from then on the mirror world is its source 
of knowledge and power (or sufficiency and attunement 
to the world). Through that mirror and the tools it 
provides, the drama of self development and then care 
of the self6 can be played out. Normally the mirror world 
is established through a form of life in touch with its 
actual place of human adaptation, and grounds the sense 
of belonging and situation that equips a human being to 
fashion a subjective trajectory through the human life-
world7. Despite the fact that each of us is encouraged to 
differentiate him/herself from his/her context, contexts 
constitute our world “from which he cannot fall” (Freud, 
1930/1985). I (especially as my imago) am completed by 
my world (and the mirror in which I see it) therefore the 
fit between the mirror world and the world of my actual 
life enables me to occupy the quasi-stable and elusive 
position of somebody somewhere with (at its best) poise 
and skill.
4.  ARTICULATING ONE’S BEING-IN-
THE-WORLD AS A REFLECTED SELF 
The discourse of truth is our means of holding each 
other to a legitimated conception of what is going on in 
the world and what we are all doing to each other. To 
do so, we take the rules that govern our meanings and 
convey them to each other as a framework of action and 
interaction. Abiding by those rules creates a ground of 
being-with-others as members of a human group who 
cooperatively adapt to the world and share techniques for 
doing so. Foucault remarks that a human being cultivates 
him or herself by using “accepted texts” originating 
and shared among one’s associates so that, in caring for 
one another, we “arm the subject with a truth it did not 
know” one that can be “progressively put into practice” 
(Foucault, 1997, p.101) Thus we can gloss the care of 
the self as resting on the dictum: “The essence of ethics 
is to connect the subject to the truth”. But we need to be 
clear that the truth at stake here is multiple and arises 
from “accepted texts” which may be different for two 
peoples who meet in a shared space. Foucault’s dictum is 
highly relevant to the development of life skills and the 
enduring need for human beings to learn to take care of 
themselves. Through the life skills that constitute the care 
of the self we learn to combine care of the self and care of 
others  in terms of what is needed for us both to become 
6 Foucault uses this term to refer to the work needed to produce 
oneself as a liveable subjectivity among others in the “human life-
world”(lebenswelt), itself a term derived from Edmund Husserl 
(Crisis in the European Sciences (Tr D. Carr) Chicago: Northwestern 
University Press, 1970).
7 Husserl.
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fully human. The becoming actualises potentiality in the 
unimpaired way that underpins mutual responsibility (or 
proper responsiveness to the effect of our actions and 
interactions on each other). Absent a shared framework of 
understanding, or a mirror in which the world is revealed, 
we cannot discern the effects of what we do to each other 
and thereby a sense of responsibility that takes account of 
what is sustainable.
It seems therefore that we have to democratize or 
liberate “the care of the self” as a vital component of that 
resistance (or persistence and sustainability of self-worth) 
that each of us needs in order to be somebody in contexts 
threatening marginalisation or anonymity. The discourse 
of the self explored by Lacan, Foucault and others, in 
that guise, is highly relevant to the post-colonial setting 
in which there are a series of fractures to be overcome in 
articulating the self and its powers as is clearly evident 
from the markers of marginalisation – poverty, ill-health, 
and imprisonment.
(i)  There is a fracture in the mirror that shows us 
ourselves-in-the-world because the traditional 
or pre-colonial mirror through which the people 
of the land have been attuned to the land of 
their belonging has been crack’d - displaced and 
devalued by the “logic” of the colonizers with its 
layers of meaning and legitimated discourses or 
“regime of truth”.
(ii)  There is a fracture in the land that they are 
connected to which has become divided up 
according to the political agenda of the colonizer 
rather than retaining its pre-colonial contours 
of  entanglement, indwelling, attunement, 
affinity,  and belonging. It has, to use Deleuze’s 
terminology, been transformed from a smooth to 
a striated space (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987).
(iii)  There is fracture in the structures of the pre-
colonial life world whereby people know how 
to deal with things and have come to some 
accommodation with them (albeit unsatisfactory 
in various ways and with fossilized injustices and 
distortions). These have established patterns of 
care of children, the organisation of resources and 
entitlements, obligations, established supports at 
times of trial, the maintenance of personal space 
and inter-relationships and so on. 
(iv)  There is a fracture between the differences in 
meaning and the differences in the human life 
world that they have been crafted to recognise, 
track and make discursively contestable. Thus 
when a young man fails in a way that leads to 
trouble and harm to others, that young man may 
be seen as a cherished promise for the future 
of his family and a current avatar of the spirits 
of his ancestors with certain responsibilities 
and chains of accountability or as an individual 
responsible for his own actions and their 
effects and needing to use his own resources 
to correct who he is toward others and what 
he has done (Elliot, 1999). These views may 
result in very different responses and patterns of 
         responsivity. 
Heidegger’s conceptualisation of the human organism 
is a “being there” – Da-sein - that articulates itself through 
questioning its involvement or engagement with the world 
and others because it cares what happens to it (therefore 
a being-in-the-world-with-others). A human being is a 
creature who speaks, questions, explores, anticipates, 
and projects thought into the future on the basis of what 
is seen in that mirror of the world that we call known 
reality. That reflection reveals things for what they are 
in relation to critters like us. My location of myself as 
somebody related to the things so revealed means that the 
soul of a human being is in a certain way the beings that 
it identifies and relates to in ways that constitute its being 
among them (HB&T, 22). This engagement is “mirrored” 
engagement, articulate, questioning, and constitutive of 
one’s being-in-the-world and, within that complex reality, 
one has a place that can be understood. On the basis 
of that understanding and the responses it potentiates, 
Dasein is entangled in a tradition which it more or less 
explicitly grasps (HB&T, 18), and in terms of which it has 
attachments and involvements, These constitute its value 
– the difference it makes by being there – and serve as 
the basis for its enaction of identity. The attachments and 
involvements also carve out a landscape of responsibility 
– things to which one ought to respond in acting thus and 
so.
The discourse of value and responsibility is therefore 
the discourse of the soul and the technologies of power 
– political, rhetorical, social, and academic – to which I 
have been exposed and that have inscribed the contours of 
my attunement to a place in the historico-cultural domain 
that is the human life-world. There I always/already find 
myself located according to a structure of meaning and 
power that has made me what I am and reflected the result 
of that poiesis back to me.  Within this situation I may or 
may not be able to forge a good enough life. When there 
are multiple fractures, in the way I am reflected, grounded, 
nurtured, and empowered, my life may not make sense to 
me (or to anybody else). But sense, coherence, identity 
and moral engagement are inevitable and demanded, so 
then I become alienated, disrupted in my being, and my 
ability to assess my own worth and that of the things 
around me atrophies. I feel that deep wound or pain in 
my soul and it may cripple me as a moral being but once 
my situation, the complex relation between my Innenwelt 
and my Umwelt, is restored then there may be ways in 
which my crack’d soul can find an integrity that will 
ground a sustainable way of being-in-the-world and the 
responsiveness and responsibility that are part if it. Until 
those issues are addressed the notion of responsibility 
must remain problematic.
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